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Abstract
The role of labeling is to solve the adverse selection problem caused
by unsubstantiated claims from rms. The problem however is likely
to remain unsolved if the labeling agency is not trustworthy. She
can be suspected to divert the fees charged for labeling from their
primary purpose of collecting information in order to raise excessive
revenue. This paper addresses this issue and shows that labeling may
be wasteful due to consumersscepticism about the trustworthiness of
labeling. To award rms green labels, the agency may charge fees that
exceed the Ramsey level at which the revenue needed for collecting
information is raised with a minimal loss in terms of e¢ ciency.
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Wasteful Labeling
1 Introduction
One prominent example of problems due to asymmetric information is the
adverse selection caused by unsubstantiated claims that goods are produced
with environmental friendlytechnologies, the so-called greenwashing phe-
nomenon. It refers to the opportunism of rms that benet from a rent of
information about the harm from the pollution they generate, at the ex-
pense of imperfectly informed consumers. A growing number of economic
studies have recently recognized ecolabeling as a possible solution to this ad-
verse selection problem. Most of the papers insist that information about
the environmental type of rms should be supplied by a third party such
as a governmental agency or a nongovernmental organization, rather than
by rms themselves. Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) claim that signaling
quality through labeling requires a reputable certication agent whom con-
sumers can trust1. In a more formal treatment, McCluskey (2000) shows
that third-party monitoring is necessary to ensure truth in labeling. Ben
Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008) argue that the presence of a credible
labeling authority is enough to induce rms to provide quality levels that
are perfectly identied by consumers. To our knowledge, Mason (2006) is
the rst analysis in which labeling by a third party sends a signal in the
1See also Kuhn (2005) for a recent survey on labeling.
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sense of Spence (1974) to uninformed consumers. A crucial assumption is
that consumers are Bayesian, meaning that, after observing the rmschoice
of certication, consumers form inferences concerning the severity of the en-
vironmental harm to make their consumption decision. Hence, consumers
can rationally infer whether rms are brown or green upon seeing the de-
cision to seek certication or not. In Mason (2006), labeling enables green
rms to signal their environmental friendliness to consumers in a way that is
both protable (green rms are better o¤ disclosing information rather than
concealing it) and credible (brown rms are worse o¤ imitating their green
counterpart). As a result, rms have the opportunity to prove that they are
trustworthy thanks to labeling by a third party.
The central question here is what if the third-party herself is not trustwor-
thy? That is, the labeling agency is suspected by consumers to manipulate
their beliefs and supply unreliable information. This paper addresses this is-
sue and shows that, if a labeling agency is to provide believable information,
she must convince consumers that she is trustworthy and is not deceiving
them. In the proposed model, labeling is handled by a benevolent agency
who has superior information about the harm from pollution generated by
rms, which is imperfectly observed by consumers. As in Crespi and Marette
(2001), the labeling agency charges rms per-unit fees to nance the xed
cost of collecting information. As they modify consumer price, the fees paid
by rms to get a truthful label play the role of signaling how harmful the
good is to consumers. This signaling motive for labeling is closely related to
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the Bayesian approach initiated by Mason (2006) in which pursuing or not
the label is the signal sent by rms to consumers. In contrast, the signal here
is sent by the agency via the fee encompassed within the consumer price.
The main result is that labeling may be wasteful due to consumersscep-
ticism about the truthfulness of labeling. If consumers trust the agency,
then the fee charged for labeling ought to raise revenue with a minimal loss
in terms of e¢ ciency: it is a pure Ramsey tax dedicated to funding the
agencys information. If, however, consumers mistrust the agency, she may
charge fees that exceed the Ramsey level to prove her trustworthiness and
award rms truthful labels.
Greenwashing encompasses all practices that range from vague claims
to misleading advertising about the environmental performance of rms.
From an early lab experiment, Boulding and Kirmani (1993) had concluded
that consumers do not necessarily perceive warranties as a credible signal of
product quality. Regarding environmental quality, Cason and Gangadharan
(2002) attribute greenwashing to some laxity in the regulation of environ-
mental claims. Some evidence that greenwashing is becoming widespread in
the U. S. can be found in the growing number of complaints about green ads
received by the Advertising Standard Authority2. To tackle the problem of
greenwashing, two main forms of labeling are usually distinguished by the
literature (see Kuhn, 2005): labeling by the rm itself and labeling by a third
2See Lyon and Maxwell (2006) for more on greenwashing, and Mahenc (2008) for rea-
sons why consumers might be misinformed about the environmental performance of prod-
ucts.
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party. The focus here is on the credibility of third-party labeling.
The model relies on two specic assumptions regarding consumers. First,
consumers have heterogeneous tastes for a polluting good: they want the
good but dislike the badbundled to the good with varying degrees. One
possible interpretation is that consumers experience heterogeneous personal
troubles from purchasing the available variety of the good. These troubles
range from simple fears to authenticated risks to personal health or the envi-
ronment. They may be caused, for instance, by the chemicals consumers can
hardly see or detect in consumption goods (such as pesticides, nitrates and
heavy metal3) and indoor air (like radon gas, formaldehyde or asbestos4), or
in genetically modied foods5. Another interpretation is that taste hetero-
geneity reects the degree of social conscience of consumers. If, for instance,
the good is fossil energy, consumers may di¤er in their dislike of the negative
impact on global warming, and if it is nuclear energy, they may di¤er in
their dislike of the potential risks imposed on future generations by nuclear
repositories. This interpretation is somehow reminiscent of the chapter 3 of
John Stuart Mills essay (1863) on utilitarianism, in which Mill defends the
3See Ibanez and Stenger (2000) for the serious consequences for health in the long term
all these chemicals can have.
4These are three of the four most dangerous substances responsible for indoor air
pollution, according to the US Environmental Protection Agency (see Lomborg 2001,
p. 183)
5The assumption of taste heterogeneity due to the safety of the good is consistent with
the evidence that there is a marked di¤erence in the consumer perception of genetically
modied foods in the EU and the US. According to Lomborg (2001), In the EU, 59
percent of the consumers view GM foods as risky and consistent majorities reject their
usefulness and nd them morally unacceptable and to be discouraged. In the US, 60
percent are positive about food technology...(see p. 343).
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possibility of humans having some social conscience that enables us to care
about what happens to others and perceive othersinterests as their own6.
Another philosophical motivation for householdsenvironmental awareness
can be derived from the concept of categorical imperative proposed by
Kant (1785). Individual concern for the environment might be one of the
moral obligations generated by the ultimate commandment of reason called
the categorical imperative. This would make environmental concern an
unconditional and self-imposed requirement that must be obeyed in all situ-
ations and circumstances.
The second specic assumption here is that consumers have not perfect
knowledge about the harm they experience. As in Mason (2006), consumers
cannot perfectly observe whether rms are brown or green. It is consistent
with the observation made by Karl and Orwat (2000) that the individual
costs of ensuring the environmental characteristics of goods are likely to be
prohibitive for consumers.
The labeling agency is responsible for disclosing information about the
environmental type of rms. She has the analytical skills and technical back-
ground to acquire full information at some xed cost, and recovers this cost
by charging competitive rms a per-unit fee in exchange for either the brown
or the green label. The agency however can spend the revenue from fees
6Two sentences from the chapter three of Utilitarianism (1863) illustrate this:
There is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests
and The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a
social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be
harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.
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on objectives other than information disclosure. This makes the budget size
valuable to her and fosters her opportunism. A novel problem of adverse
selection may then arise, which has been so far neglected by the literature
on labeling7: knowing that the fee determines the level of the consumer
price, the agency might be tempted to manipulate consumersbeliefs on the
severity of the harm from pollution through her fee choice, in order to raise
revenues in excess of the spending on information. Aware of this, consumers
will place little condence in the labels from the agency. Such a scepticism
in turn requires the agencys strategies to be both benecial and credible:
benecial in the sense that information disclosure must be valuable to the
agency, and credible in the sense that the fees specied for one environmental
harm would not be worth imitating if the environmental harm were di¤erent.
The agencys choice of fee constrained by the budget requirement is for-
malized as a signaling game in which labeling is truthful as long as fees
separate the environmental types of rms in equilibrium. A prominent result
is that the fees charged for the green label do not necessarily coincide with
that designed to raise revenue with a minimal loss in terms of e¢ ciency. The
analysis characterizes separating equilibria robust to the intuitive criterion
in which the agency awards rms the green label with fees that exceed the
Ramsey level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the structure of
the model. Section 3 states the results in the benchmark case where the
7See Amacher et alii (2004), Crampes and Ibanez (1996), Kuhn (1999) and Rege (2000).
7
agency is trustworthy. Section 4 investigates the signaling model designed
to address this issue and characterizes separating equilibria satisfying the
intuitive criterionof Cho and Kreps (1987). Section 5 o¤ers conclusions.
2 The model
Consider a horizontally di¤erentiated market structure similar in spirit to a
Hotelling model where consumerstastes for a good are uniformly distributed
along a segment of unit length. One novelty here is that taste heterogeneity
is due to negative externalities generated by the good and transportation
costs resemble the harm generated by these externalities. Moreover, exter-
nalities are experience or credence attributes of the good in the sense that
consumers have not perfect knowledge about the harm they experience. Ex-
ternalities work through a single aggregate, called pollution for concreteness,
which lowers their willingness to pay for the good. The consumer taste is
represented by distance x from the good. The good provides consumers with
the same gross surplus of value v.
Potentially, there are two varieties of the good on the market: either
a brown variety (i = b) or a green one (i = g) that are produced using
respectively a dirty and an environmentally friendly technology. Consumers
are assumed to have the same aversion to pollution, which is modelled as the
transportation cost "i per unit of distance to variety i. All consumers agree
to rank the brown variety and its green counterpart in the same way with
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respect to environmental friendliness, hence "b > "g. Consumer xs personal
harm from the pollution generated by variety i is measured by the linear
transportation cost "ix to variety i.
The market area is not restricted a priori but is determined by market
prices and consumer willingness to pay. Consumers purchase at most one
unit of the good and get zero surplus if they do not buy. A consumer located
at x derives a surplus v pi "ix from purchasing variety i at price pi. Hence,
the market area X solves equation:
v   pi   "iX = 0; (1)
and the demand for variety i is given by:
X (pi; "i)  v   pi
"i
: (2)
The social harm (or environmental damage) caused by pollution is given
by the sum of individual harms, that is,
X(pi;"i)Z
0
"ixdx = "iX (pi; "i)
2 =2.
The good is supplied by competitive rms. The technology (production
plus pollution abatement) required to produce variety i will be represented
by the rms cost function c(q; "i) = c ("i) q, where q is the output. Un-
like brown rms, green rms use advanced abatement technologies and clean
up wastes. One usually expects such e¤orts to reduce the environmental
damage at the expense of signicant private costs. Hence, a natural assump-
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tion is c ("b) < c ("g), that is, the marginal production costs of green rms
are higher than those of brown rms8. Moreover, to eliminate corner solu-
tions, v will be taken in the parameter conguration such that c ("g) < v <
min fc ("g) + "g; c ("b) + "bg. These inequalities guarantee, rst, that produc-
ing either variety is socially e¢ cient; and second, that the market is never
fully covered.9
A labeling agency is responsible for providing information about the en-
vironmental friendliness of the good, hence the actual harm from pollution.
Once she has collected full information on "i, she can award rms ecolabels
that certify their environmental type. Learning the true harm from pollution
is assumed to be prohibitively costly to consumers, whereas the agency can
secure full information about "i at a xed cost I. Moreover, the agency is
able to infer ci from the observed "i, thereby sharing the same information
as rms about their production costs, hence their environmental type. In-
forming consumers about the pollution harm is not the only environmental
service to be supplied by the agency. She also earmarks funds for various
purposes such as clean-up programs or transfers to special-interest groups.
The part of funds diverted from collecting information about "i is normalized
to zero without loss of generality. It su¢ ces to keep in mind that the budget
8The statement that there is a trade-o¤ between environmental improvements and
rms e¢ ciency is consistent with the conclusions of Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) or
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) for the U. S. economy.
9Indeed, v   c ("b) > v   c ("g) > 0 implies X (c ("i) ; "i) > 0; i = b; g. Furthermore,
v < c ("g) + "g and v < c ("b) + "b imply X (c ("g) ; "g) < 1 and X (c ("b) ; "b) < 1,
respectively.
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size is valuable to the agency even in the case where I = 0.
Consumers mistrust the environmental claims made by rms due to wide-
spread practices of greenwashing. Moreover, there is no evidence that con-
sumers consider the agency to be more reliable than rms. In particular,
they may suspect the agency to manipulate their beliefs on the severity of
the pollution harm in order to raise revenues in excess of what is strictly
required for securing information. Two cases will be distinguished depend-
ing on whether consumers nd the agency trustworthy or not. The agency
will be said to be trustworthy when she is fully benevolent and breaks even
regarding her labeling activity. The non-trustworthy agency di¤ers in that
she is likely to earmark funds for goals other than information disclosure,
which makes consumers sceptical about the credibility of labeling.
In practice, ecolabeling programs entail a per-unit licensing fee (see Ma-
son, 2006, or Crespi and Marette, 2001). This amounts to consider here that
the agency charges a specic (per-unit) fee ti on variety i to nance cost I.
As there is no substitute for the available variety, the fee paid by rms turns
to be an entry fee into the market, which makes labeling here compulsory10.
Certication directly follows from the fee choice, that is, the label brownis
10As pointed by one referee, this somewhat restricts the analysis since labeling is usually
viewed as voluntary (see Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed, 2008, for a denition of ecola-
beling). Nevertheless, it turns out that mandatory labeling is required in some instances
such as for genetically modied foods in Australia and New Zealand, water-using products
in Australia since 2006 or households refrigerators by 2015 in South Africa. In the U. S.,
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 involves a mandatory disclosure of in-
formation in addition to voluntary nutrient content claims and health claims (see Caswell
and Mojduszka,1996)
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associated with tb and the label greenwith tg. Although consumers cannot
directly observe neither "i nor ci, they have formed beliefs about "i before
making their purchase decision. Consumers perceive the good to be green
with the prior probability 0  prob("i = "g), and brown with the prior
probability 1  0  prob("i = "b), 0 2 (0; 1).
Under perfect competition, the price paid by consumers in equilibrium is
given by pei = c ("i) + ti. This level is observed by consumers as a whole, in
particular, it is assumed that consumers have no way of isolating the part
of pei corresponding to c ("i). Hence, p
e
i is a potential signal from which
consumers can try to infer the actual harm from pollution. Note that the
producer price is not a strategic variable here, and so it cannot directly play
the role of a signal on the rms environmental performance as in Mahenc
(2008). Consumersposterior beliefs will be denoted by  (ti) : R+ ! [0; 1]
giving the probability weight the consumer attaches to the possibility that
the good is green after observing the consumer price c ("i) + ti. If    (ti),
then "e()  "g + (1   )"b is the perception that consumers have of the
pollution harm after observing c ("i) + ti.
Let us introduce further notations:
 V ("i)  v   c ("i) is the gross consumer surplus at the equilibrium
price.
 Di (ti; )  V ("i) ti"e() is the demand resulting from the inference process
at equilibrium.
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    Xp (p; "i) p=X (p; "i) = pv p will denote the price elasticity of
demand (here and throughout, subscripts denote partial derivatives
and primes denote derivatives with respect to a single variable).
 e  [Xp (c ("i) + t; "i) c0 (") +X" (c ("i) + ti; "i)] "i=X (c ("i) + ti; "i) will
denote the pollution elasticity of demand at equilibrium. It measures
the overall e¤ect of harm increases on demand. The sign of e depends
on two opposite e¤ects: a price e¤ect (more harmful goods are sold at
lower prices, which encourages their demand relatively to less harmful
goods) and a green e¤ect (demand is lower for more harmful goods
due to consumersaversion to pollution). Straightforward calculations
yield that e = V
0("i) X(c("i)+ti;"i)
X(c("i)+ti;"i)
. When V 0 ("i) X (c ("i) + ti; "i) < 0,
the marginal valuation of pollution harm by the marginal consumer is
negative and so is e. In this case, the green e¤ect dominates the price
e¤ect and an increase in the harm reduces the market area.
We now turn to the agencys behavior. The agency is assumed to correctly
anticipate the equilibrium price of the market. She aims to maximize social
welfare subject to the constraint that the revenue Ri (ti; )  tiDi (ti; )
raised from fees covers all her expenditures, I included. Formally, this re-
quires the budget constraint to be non-negative. Clearly, the severity of the
budget constraint depends on consumersbeliefs. Optimistic beliefs about
the pollution harm, i. e.,  is close to 1, enlarge the market size, thereby
increasing the revenue raised from a given fee. We will denote ti() and ti()
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respectively the lowest and highest fee for which the agency breaks even, i. e.,
tiD
i (ti; )   I = 0. To ensure the existence of such fees whatever the value
of , we will restrict the parameters of the model to satisfy the following
assumption
I  V ("g)
2
4"b
(3)
Under (3), easy calculations show that ti() =

V ("i) 
q
V ("i)
2   4I"e()

=2
and ti() =

V ("i) +
q
V ("i)
2   4I"e()

=2. It can be checked that, for
any fee t,
 tb (0) > tb (1) and tb(0) < tb(1), thus tDb (t; 0) I  0) tDb (t; 1) I 
0;
 tg(1) < tg(0) and tg(0) < tg(1), thus tDg (t; 0) I  0) tDg (t; 1) I 
0;
 tb() < tg() and tg() < tb(), thus tDg (t; )  I  0) tDb (t; ) 
I  0:
Hence, whatever the environmental type of rms, we have, rst, that
optimistic beliefs about the pollution harm loosen the budget constraint for
a given harm, and second, that the budget constraint is tighter when the
harm is lower for given beliefs. Note that Rit (t; ) =
V ("i) 2t
"e()
> 0 for all
t < V ("i)
2
, which rules out any La¤er e¤ect for fees lower than V ("i)
2
, a common
assumption in the literature. As will appear in the remainder of the analysis,
there is no need to make such a restriction here.
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The social welfare function W i(ti; ) can be written in the following re-
duced form function:
W i(ti; )  (V ("i)  ti)Di (ti; ) 
Di(ti;)Z
0
"ixdx (4)
=
(V ("i)  ti)2
"e()

1  "i
2"e()

(5)
Were the agency indi¤erent to the level of the budget, she would have
to solve the rst-best problem and chooses X = V ("i) ="i that maximizes
V ("i)   "iX2=2. In such a case, there would be no reason to charge a fee
since X = X (ci; "i): the market would implement by itself the rst-best
optimal allocation. This boils down to consider that the cost I of collecting
information is negligible, hence consumers can freely free-ride on the agency
to obtain full information on "i. Consequently, the derivative W it (t; ) is
negative for all t such that the demand Di (t; ) is positive. Note that, from
the social standpoint, the least favorable belief that consumers can hold is
 = 0 when rms are green, whereas it is  = 1 when rms are brown.
However, even though she is benevolent, the agency can spend the money
collected from fees on various objectives besides that of informing consumers.
The agencys discretion about her expenditures motivates her potential op-
portunism. Hence, the agency might be tempted to take advantage of con-
sumers imperfect knowledge and divert the fee revenue from its primary
purpose of informing. Aware of this, consumers have reasons to be scep-
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tical about the certication of environmental friendliness provided by the
agency. As we shall see, such a scepticism introduces further requirements
that guarantee the credibility of labeling.
In the presence of sceptical consumers, the agencys objective function
can be written as the following Lagrange function:
Li(ti; )  W i(ti; ) + i
 
tiD
i (ti; )  I

; (6)
where the Lagrange multiplier i  0 represents the social opportunity
cost of spending money on consumer information relative to other activities
of the agency. Hence, i is a choice variable which measures the discretion
of the agency about her expenditures. When i is optimally chosen to be
low, the budget requirement is not asking for much. Large values of i will
indicate that the agency takes good care about raising revenue. Her behavior
then resembles more that of a prot-maximizing monopolist on the market
for labeling, rather than the functioning of a competitive market with the
free entry constraint tiDi (ti; ) = I.
3 The benchmark with a trustworthy agency
Of central concern is how the optimal behavior of the agency is a¤ected by
consumersimperfect knowledge of the pollution harm. As a benchmark, we
record what would be the optimal behavior of a trustworthy agency under
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incomplete information. The sense of trustworthiness here is twofold: the
agency is benevolent and she breaks even, that is, all the revenue from the
fee is pledged to pay the cost I which strictly corresponds to that of collecting
information. The Lagrangian then becomes
(V ("i)  ti)2
2"i
+ i (tiX (c ("i) + ti; "i)  I) :
Proposition 1: When the agency is trustworthy, her optimal choice
consists of a fee t ("i) and a non-negative Lagrange multiplier  ("i) such
that:
t ("i)
pei
=
 ("i)  1
 ("i)
1

; (7)
or, equivalently,
t ("i) =
 ("i)  1
2 ("i)  1V ("i) with t ("b) = tb (0) ; t ("g) = tg (1) (8)
and  ("i) =
1
2
+
V ("i)
2
q
V ("i)
2   4I"i
: (9)
Proof : (see Appendix 1)
Converting the specic fee to an ad valorem rate t("i)
pei
yields formula (7)
which states that the ad valorem rate should be proportional to the inverse
of the price elasticity of demand. Hence, it is optimal to choose a higher fee
for varieties with a low price elasticity than for varieties with a high price
elasticity. When the agency is trustworthy, t ("i) is akin to a pure Ramsey
tax in the sense that the fee is designed to raise revenue with a minimal loss
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in terms of e¢ ciency. It is worth using the explicit expression of  ("i) given
by (9) to interpret (7). When I is close to zero,  ("i) approaches its lowest
value 1 and t ("i) also tends to zero. Hence, we have the aforementioned rst-
best solution at the limit: the market by itself can implement the socially
optimal allocation. In this case, there is no budget requirement regarding
consumersinformation since the cost of collecting information is negligible,
and the budget requirement for alternative purposes is normalized to zero.
By contrast, in the polar situation where I becomes as large as possible under
(3), we have that  ("i) ! +1 , i. e., the budget requirement becomes the
main concern of the agency who then charges a fee close to the inverse of the
price elasticity. Interestingly enough, this would also be the optimal choice
of a private agency enjoying a monopoly position on the market for labeling.
Indeed, from (8), when  ("i)! +1 , the agency is better o¤ charging a fee
close to V ("i)
2
: this coincides with the price set by a prot-maximizing mo-
nopolist selling the true information on "i to consumers. Furthermore, it can
be checked that  ("i) = 11  . Since  ("i) must be non-negative, the trust-
worthy agency always operates in a fee region such that the price elasticity
of demand is lower than 1, i. e., the good is essential (such as potatoes).
Lastly, it can be pointed out that there is no La¤er e¤ect at the optimal fee
since Rit (t ("i) ; ) =
V ("i) 2t("i)
"e()
> 0, whatever . This is consistent with the
evidence against the existence of La¤er e¤ect (see Fullerton (1982)).
We end the analysis of the trustworthy agency by showing how changes
in the magnitude of the harm from pollution a¤ect the optimal fee t ("i).
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Lemma 1: For all I 2
h
0; V ("g)
2
4"b
i
, t ("b)  t ("g) and the derivative t0 ("i)
can be written
t0 ("i) =   1
1  
t ("i)
"i
e (10)
Proof : (see Appendix 2)
As a result, the optimal fee t ("i) rises as the harm from pollution is
more severe. Moreover, equation (10) shows that the pollution elasticity of
demand at the equilibrium price e is negative. As previously seen, this
occurs when the green e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect so that demand is
pollution sensitive.
4 Untrustworthy agency
Let us now consider that the agency uses fees to spending other than that
strictly required by information collection. This amounts to consider that
the agency can raise an amount of revenue higher than I with the fee. In
addition, the information conveyed by labeling becomes doubtful since the
fee may be diverted from its primary purpose of collecting information. How-
ever, consumers can use the consumer price as a signal to get information
about the actual harm and the environmental type of rms. This inference
process imposes two further requirements on the agencys behavior. First,
the agency must be willing to reveal information, and second, the agencys
strategy must be credible in the sense that the actions specied for one
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pollution harm could not be imitated if the harm were di¤erent. In other
terms, the untrustworthy agency ought to satisfy an individual-rationality
(IR) constraint and an incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint, which follow
from using the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. This gives the model
a signaling structure which merely di¤ers from the standard Spencian game
in that the set of signaling strategies is reduced by the budget requirement.
Restricting attention to pure strategies, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
this game is a set of strategies f(ti )i=b;gg and a probability distribution  (ti)
such that strategies must be optimal given consumersbeliefs. Formally, this
requires that, for each i = b; g,
ti 2 argmax
ti
W i(ti; 
(ti)) + i
 
tiD
i (ti; 
(ti))  I

: (11)
Consumers form posterior beliefs from their prior beliefs by using Bayes
rule:
If tg 6= tb , then 
 
tg

= 1 and  (tb) = 0; (12)
If tg = t

b , then 
  tg =  (tb) = 0: (13)
As the equilibrium concept places no restriction on beliefs for fees o¤ the
equilibrium path, we will restrict as usual the consumersbeliefs to satisfy the
intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987)). An equilibrium in which the
level of social welfare is W i when rms type is i fails to survive the intuitive
criterion if there exists a deviation d satisfying the budget constraint with
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 (d) = 1, such that:
W g < W g(d; 1); (14)
W b(d; 0)  W b: (15)
Consider rst the (IR) constraints. Recall that tb (1) (resp. tg(0)) is the
lowest fee for which the agency breaks even, when the true environmental
type of rms is b (resp. g) and consumers believe that they are green (resp.
brown) with certainty (the least favorable beliefs through the agencys eyes).
The (IR) constraints can be written as follows for any tb inside

tb (0) ; tb(0)

and any tg inside

tg (1) ; tg(1)

:
W b(tb ; 0)  W b(tb (1) ; 1) (16)
W g(tg; 1)  W g(tg(0); 0) (17)
These constraints guarantee that the agency is willing to disclose infor-
mation and award rms truthful labels, rather than conceal information.
Let us now turn to the (IC) constraints. They secure the credibility of
labeling by imposing that the agency should not defect to the equilibrium
fee that awards the wrong label. Neglecting the budget constraints, the (IC)
21
constraints is written as follows:
W b(tg; 1)  W b(tb ; 0) (18)
W g(tg; 1)  W g(tb ; 0): (19)
What (18) says is that the agency should not be tempted to deviate from
tb to t

g when rms are brown. In this case, such a deviation is conceivable as
long as tg is inside

tb (1) ; tb(1)

, otherwise the deviation would not satisfy
the budget requirement consistent with the certainty that rms are green.
As tb(1) < tg(1), if (16) is satised, then (18) is satised as well. Condition
(19) precludes a deviation from tg towards t

b when rms are green. To be
consistent with consumerscertainty that rms are brown, such a deviation
must satisfy tg  tg (0), thereby yielding W g(tg; 0)  W g(tg(0); 0). However,
by (17), this would not generate a higher welfare than that obtained with
tg . Thus, if (17) is satised, then (19) is satised as well. The signaling
game has the unusual feature that mimicry is not an issue: from the moment
that the agency fullls the (IR) constraints, she is worse o¤ imitating the
fees specied for a pollution harm di¤erent from reality. For labeling to be
credible, it su¢ ces that the agency be willing to reveal information, that is,
conditions (16) and (17) are fullled under the budget requirements. These
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constraints can be respectively expressed as follows:
(V ("b)  tb)2
2"b
 (V ("b)  tb (1))
2
"g

1  "b
2"g

(20)
 
V ("g)  tg
2
2"g

 
V ("g)  tg(0)
2
"b

1  "g
2"b

(21)
Let Tb (resp. Tg) denote the set of equilibrium fees tb (resp. t

g) for which
condition (20) (resp. (21) holds, and  b (resp.  g) the solution in tb (resp.
tg) of the equality version of (20) (resp. (21)). As any t

b must also satisfy the
budget requirement, Tb is not empty when parameter values are such that
(V ("b)  tb (0))2
2"b
 (V ("b)  tb (1))
2
"g

1  "b
2"g

: (22)
This existence condition for a separating equilibrium requires that I be
su¢ ciently small, namely lower than eI = V ("b)2 > 011.
Proposition 2: Assume that I  min
neI; V ("g)2
4"b
o
. Then, separation can
be achieved by any pair
 
tb ; t

g
 2 [tb (0) ;  b] tg (1) ;  g.
Proposition 2 establishes the conditions under which the agency is will-
ing to implement truthful labeling so that separation of the environmental
types can be achieved. There is an innity of possible equilibrium fees that
signal the true environmental types, regardless of whether rms are brown
11Cumbersome calculations show that  =
p
e(2 e) 1
p
e(2 e)

"g
p
e(2 e) "b

("b "ge(2 e)) , where
e = "b"g < 1.
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or green. These equilibrium fees range from the Ramsey level t ("i) charac-
terized in Proposition 1, to fees higher than that level. At ti = t ("i), i. e.,
tb = tb (0) and t

g = tg (1), the agency signals the true harm from pollution
while raising revenue with a minimal loss in terms of e¢ ciency. Nevertheless,
this is no longer true if the agency sets ti > t ("i). Then, the agency fully
reveals information to consumers with a fee that yields an amount of revenue
in excess of what is needed to break even, thereby generating a welfare loss.
Separation can be achieved with upward-biased fees because consumers do
not internalize the changes in revenue they impose on the agency by dis-
torting their consumption. This leaves the agency some freedom to increase
her revenue with fees above the Ramsey level, while meeting the twofold re-
quirement of awarding rms true labels and recovering the cost of collecting
information. Obviously, such fees create a welfare loss by reducing too much
consumption compared to what would occur with fees equal to t ("i), but
they also allow the agency to a¤ord the cost of collecting information and
nance alternative spending.
Let us now examine the existence of separating equilibrium fees robust
to the intuitive criterion. Indeed, some of the separating equilibria identied
above do not seem quite reasonable. Suppose for instance that separation
is achieved in equilibrium by a pair
 
tb ; t

g

such that tb < t

g, yielding wel-
fare W b and W g. Then, according to the logic of the intuitive criterion,
the agency may be tempted to deviate from tg to t

b +  < t

g. Indeed, we
simultaneously have W g < W g(tb + ; 1) and W
b(tb + ; 0) < W
b, so that,
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consumers should infer upon observing tb +  that rms are certainly green.
Thus, any separating equilibrium in which tb < t

g fails to survive the intu-
itive criterion. Now, if
 
tb ; t

g

is such that tg < t

b , the same reasoning shows
that tb = tb (0) is the only fee paid by brown rms to be consistent with the
intuitive criterion. Proposition 3 characterizes all the separating equilibrium
fees consistent with the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 3: There exists a whole range of separating equilibria sat-
isfying the intuitive criterion such that tb = tb (0) and t

g 2

tg (1) ; tb (0)

:
The untrustworthy agency can truthfully signal the environmental types
of rms by behaving as if she were trustworthy. To award labels, she then
charges brown and green rms respectively t ("b) = tb (0) and t ("g) = tg (1),
thereby raising revenue with a minimal loss in terms of e¢ ciency. However,
unlike the trustworthy agency, the untrustworthy agency can also charge
green rms a fee tg higher than tg (1) to the extent that t

g remains below tb (0).
Consumersscepticism is then substantiated by a whole range of equilibrium
fees that simultaneously reveal that rms are green and raise an amount
of revenue in excess of what is required to balance the cost of collecting
information. Clearly, such fees create a welfare loss compared to the situation
prevailing with fees set at the Ramsey level. Nevertheless, the renement of
the intuitive criterion fails to eliminate the separating equilibria in which tg
is biased upward with respect to tg (1). To obtain full information though
labeling, sceptical consumers must pay for the cost of collecting information,
but they are also likely to pay for alternative goals pursued by the agency.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the signaling role of labeling in a context where
consumers lack information about the environmental type of rms, that is,
the actual harm caused by the good they sell. In response to the standard
problem of adverse selection due to rmsopportunism, a labeling agency
can acquire full information at a cost and charge a fee to award rms green
or brown labels. This may raise another problem of adverse selection now due
to the agencys opportunism and the consumersscepticism about the label
trustworthiness. To the extent that she cares about the size of her revenue,
the agency might be tempted to raise an amount of revenue in excess to what
is required solely by the cost of collecting information. It turns out that such
a wasteful behavior may emerge in equilibrium with the fees signaling green
rms.
The analysis characterizes the separating equilibrium fees associated with
truthful labeling and shows that the credibility of labeling is not an issue
because mimicry is worthless. Although the incentive-compatibility con-
straints required by the concept of Bayesian equilibrium are not binding,
the individual-rationality constraints give rise to an innity of separating
equilibria. Moreover, there exists a whole range of separating equilibria ro-
bust to the intuitive criterion, in which the fees used to truthfully signal green
rms do not necessarily coincide with that designed to raise revenue with a
minimal loss in terms of e¢ ciency. In other terms, revealing that rms are
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green is consistent with fees that are biased upward relative to the Ramsey
level. Hence, labeling green rms is likely to generate wasteful expenditures
when consumers do not trust the labeling agency.
As previously mentioned, one limit of the present model is that labeling is
mandatory since rms cannot enter the market unless they pay the labeling
fee. To allow for voluntary labeling, one possibility is to address the signaling
issue in a model of vertically di¤erentiated products à la Shaked and Sutton
(1982) where labeling serves the dual task of di¤erentiating products and
transmitting information on quality.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
The rst-order conditions of the agencys constrained optimization problem
yield:
 V ("i)  t
"i
+ i (X (c ("i) + t; "i) + tXp (c ("i) + t; "i)) = 0; (23)
i (tX (c ("i) + t; "i)  I) = 0; (24)
i  0: (25)
Using the expression of demand (2), condition (23) can be rewritten
  (V ("i)  t) + i (V ("i)  2t) = 0 (26)
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This equation yields t ("i) =
("i) 1
2("i) 1V ("i) in (8). SubstitutingX (c ("i) + t; "i)
to V ("i) t
"i
in the left-hand side of (23), we get (7). The equation derived from
the budget constraint (24) admits an upper and lower root in t, that is, re-
spectively,

V ("i) +
q
V ("i)
2   4I"i

=2 and

V ("i) 
q
V ("i)
2   4I"i

=2.
From (26) and the fact that  ("i) is non-negative, we have that t ("i) must
be lower than V ("i) =2, thereby implying both t ("b) = tb (0) and t ("g) =
tg (1) in (8). The expression of  ("i) given in (9) is obtained from t ("i) =
("i) 1
2("i) 1V ("i) by substituting

V ("i) 
q
V ("i)
2   4I"i

=2 to t ("i).
6.2 Appendix 2: Proof of lemma 1
From proposition 1, we know that t ("i) =

V ("i) 
q
V ("i)
2   4I"i

=2
provided that i > 0, where t ("i) is the lowest root of tX (c ("i) + t; "i) = I.
Di¤erentiating the budget equation tX (c ("i) + t; "i) = I with respect to t
and I yields
@t ("i)
@I
=
1
X (c ("i) + t ("i) ; "i) + t ("i)Xp
=
"iq
V ("i)
2   4I"i
:
From this expression, we can see that, for all I 2
h
0; V ("g)
2
4"b
i
,
@2t ("i)
@I@"i
=
V ("i)
2   2I"i 
V ("i)
2   4I"i
 3
2
> 0:
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Thus, t ("i) is an increasing function of I with a higher slope as "i rises.
Since, at I = 0, we have t ("b) = t ("g), we obtain that t ("b) > t ("g) for all
I 2 (0; V ("g)2
4"b
].
To obtain the di¤erential t0 ("i), we now di¤erentiate tX (c ("i) + t; "i) = I
with respect to t and " (subscript i is omitted for notational simplicity)
t (Xpc
0 (") +X") d"+ (X + tXp) dt = 0: (27)
Rearranging terms, we get
(1 + tXp=X) t
0 (") =  t (Xpc0 (") +X") =X (28)
As 1+ tXp=X = 1  t ("i) =pei , it can be checked that 1+ tXp=X = 1("i)
by using (7). From the denition of e, we obtain
t0 ("i) =   ("i) t ("i)
"i
e: (29)
Replacing  ("i) by 11  gives (10).
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